Trends. The Psychology of War and Peace: Good and Bad Demons in Yugoslavia by Editor, IBPP
International Bulletin of Political 
Psychology 
Volume 6 Issue 13 Article 3 
4-2-1999 
Trends. The Psychology of War and Peace: Good and Bad 
Demons in Yugoslavia 
Editor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp 
 Part of the Military, War, and Peace Commons, and the Other Psychology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Editor (1999) "Trends. The Psychology of War and Peace: Good and Bad Demons in Yugoslavia," 
International Bulletin of Political Psychology: Vol. 6 : Iss. 13 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol6/iss13/3 
This Trends is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in International Bulletin of Political Psychology by an authorized administrator of Scholarly 
Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu. 
International Bulletin of Political Psychology  
1 
 
Title: Trends. The Psychology of War and Peace: Good and Bad Demons in Yugoslavia 




Keywords: Bombings, Demonization, NATO, Peace, Psychology, War, Yugoslavia 
 
Demonization and war go together in good ways and bad. To whip up war fever, to develop and 
maintain morale and cohesion of fighting forces and of those for whom they allegedly fight, to dissuade 
and dissipate oppositional opinions to one's war initiatives, to keep one's own doubts in check--these 
are all "good" examples of demonization in the eyes of war leaders. 
 
However, demonization has at least three "bad" consequences for these war leaders. First, it can make 
less severe and less intense applications of military power less likely to be employed--even if these 
applications would have a greater likelihood of achieving the political objectives that are the goals of 
most war-fighting. Second, demonization renders the sorts of negotiations that usually follow war more 
difficult--for demons cannot be negotiated with. Instead, they are beyond negotiation. Third, 
demonization is too often self-reflexive. In other words, in perceiving "the other" as demonized and in 
conceiving of ways to destroy the demon, one may become a demon as well. 
 
Of immediate concern for the ongoing NATO bombing of Yugoslavia is this: a NATO leader becomes less 
likely to change course even if that course is incorrect. Constructive negotiation--the very lack of which 
partially precipitated the bombing and the attainment of which is a sometimes-stated goal of bombing--
becomes less likely to occur. And one is too likely to engage in behavior that seems less and less 
different in ethics and morality from the demonized adversary. In other words, one becomes--in so far 
as identity stems from action--the demonized adversary. 
 
The tragedy of the crisis in Serbia and Kosovo is not only what has happened to Kosovar Albanians and 
democratic opponents of Slobodan Milosevic, but also what may be happening to NATO leaders. (See 
Cohen, R. (1999). West ponders how to make demonized Milosevic into a savior of peace. The New York 
Times, p. A10; Diamond, S.A. (1996). Anger, madness, and the daimonic: The psychological genesis of 
violence, evil, and creativity. State University of New York Press; Funch, B.S. (1984). The demonic. Psyke 
and Logos, 5, 125-141; Grotstein, J.S. (1997). "Internal objects" or "chimerical monsters"? The demonic 
"third forms" of the internal word. Journal of Analytical Psychology, 42, 47-80.) (Keywords: Bombings, 
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